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THE NUCLEAR TEST-BAN 
TREATY: 
GATEWAY TO PEACE 
Since the beginning of history, the life of man 
has been shadowed by the fear of war. Since the 
end of the Second World War, man's fear of war 
has been immeasurably heightened by the inven- 
tion of nuclear weapons. The elimination of war 
has long been man's hope; now it is his urgent 
necessity if he is to survive on this planet. Nothing 
has preoccupied humanity more in the years since 
1945 than the effort to abolish war and, as part of 
that effort, to bring about universal disarmament. 
Yet nothing has frustrated men of goodwill more 
than the failure of the great nations to agree on 
how they might safely disarm. Many things have 
contributed to that failure : the historic legacy of 
suspicion among nation-states ; the inherent tension 
between closed and open societies; the technical 
difficulties of devising mechanisms of inspection and 
control; the political difficulties of accepting mech- 
anisms of enforcement; even perhaps the vested 
interests which some dogmas and institutions may 
have in the perpetuation of crisis. All these things 
account for the terrifying gap between humanity's 
hope and man's achievement in the conquest of 
war. 
From the day in June 1946 when Bernard 
Baruch, on behalf of the United States, offered to 
surrender the American monopoly of atomic weap- 
ons to a United Nations authority empowered to 
control all atomic activities, men have submitted 
a variety of plans to limit and to eliminate the 
weapons by which nations might destroy each 
other. Some of these plans have been serious; 
others have been mere polemics or propaganda. 
And yet in these 16 years under the shadow of the 
mushroom cloud, almost no progress has been 
achieved toward serious control. The single excep- 
tion-the one ray of light in a dark decade of 
stalemate-has been the test-ban talks in Geneva. 
The Test-Ban Treaty 
The Conference on the Discontinuance of Nu- 
clear Weapon Tests began on October 3 1, 1958. 
The participants have been the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. For over 
330 sessions, representatives of these three nations 
have sat around the conference table in earnest 
discussion of intricate scientific and political ques- 
tions. The forbidding technicality of the talks has 
not concealed the terrible gravity of the issues at 
stake. And the overhanging sense of gravity pro- 
duced for a time in 1958-60 a season of genuine 
negotiation. There was give and take. Areas 
of disagreement narrowed. In 2% years the con- 
ference succeeded in adopting a preamble, 17 
articles, and 2 annexes of a draft treaty. While 
important issues remained, it seemed at last as if 
the great powers could agree on at least one con- 
crete program as a prelude to a broader attack on 
the institution of war. 
When President Kennedy took office in January 
1961, he called for an immediate and intensive 
review of United States policy in order to over- 
come the remaining obstacles and bring the con- 
ference to a successful conclusion. Ambassador 
Arthur Dean, resuming the Geneva discussions in 
March, came with a new set of proposals designed 
to meet all legitimate Soviet reservations. Then, 
in a painstaking process, the United States and the 
United Kingdom combined all the new proposals 
plus every agreement previously reached in a com- 
plete nuclear test-ban treaty. That treaty was 
put on the table at Geneva on April 18, 1961. 
This historic document promises to end the fear 
of nuclear tests and radioactive fallout through a 
pledge by all signatory nations not to test nuclear 
weapons-a pledge to be made meaningful by in- 
ternational inspection. How would this be done? 
The treaty proposes to ban under adequate safe- 
guards : 
1. All tests in the earth's atmosphere-the main 
source of radioactive fallout. 
2. All tests in outer space. 
3. All tests in the oceans. 
4. All tests underground, except those produc- 
ing signals of less than 4.75 seismic magni- 
tude. 
The treaty omits underground tests below the 
4.75 threshold pending improvement in detection 
methods through a seismic research program. In 
the interim, while research is carried out on detec- 
tion methods, there would be a 3-year moratorium 
on such tests. The ultimate objective is a treaty 
which would ban all tests under appropriate 
guarantees. 
After signature by the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, the treaty would 
be open to other nations of the world, small and 
large. The treaty would be policed by a 
worldwide detection system operated by a single 
administrator and an international staff. The 
administrator and his staff would be under the 
policy direction of a Control Commission, com- 
posed of four representatives from the Soviet side, 
four from the Anglo-American side, and three neu- 
trals. The headquarters would be in Vienna. 
The staff would operate 180 fixed control posts on 
land and on ships at sea, equipped with instru- 
ments for detecting illegal tests by their sound, 
light, radio waves, nuclear radiations, radioactive 
debris, or earthshock. The control posts would be 
supplemented in doubtful cases by inspection- 
carried out by international teams of experts-at 
the site of a possible violation. To remove any 
fear that inspectors would ''rove" beyond their irn- 
mediate assignment, the treaty would lay down 
strict safeguards: inspection teams would be ac- 
companied by observers from the host country, 
would travel along routes prescribed by the host 
country, and would inspect only a restricted area 
predetermined by the seismic data. 
By itself, the treaty banning nuclear weapons 
testing is, of course, a limited measure. But, as a 
first step in the world's assault on the institution of 
war, it could be a measure of incalculable impor- 
tance. The treaty would bring about a number of 
tangible gains for humanity. It would slow down 
the arms race. I t  would eliminate the risk of bio- 
logical and genetic damage from radioactive stron- 
tium and the other poisonous materials cast off by 
nuclear explosions in the atmosphere. I t  would 
check the multiplication of new types of nuclear 
weapons and discourage the spread of nuclear 
weapons to additional nations, thereby reducing 
the hazard of accidental war. 
Above all, it would mark a great adventure in 
international collaboration for peace. The test- 
ban treaty contains most of the issues of trust and 
verification found in the wider and more difficult 
field of general disarmament. Out of the experi- 
ence with the test-ban treaty could come the 
mutual confidence, the tested procedures, and the 
concerted policies which would enable the world 
to mount a wider and deeper attack on war itself. 
If the great nations can set up a collective system 
which effectively abolishes nuclear tests, surely they 
can hope to set up a collective system which effec- 
tively abolishes all the diverse and manifold weap- 
ons of human self -destruction. 
In the long frustrations of the disarmament 
fight, the test-ban treaty was the world's first hope 
of progress. It is this hope which the Soviet 
Union, through an abrupt and inexplicable rever- 
sal of its own position, now threatens to dash from 
our lips. 
The Soviet Alternative 
Ambassador Semyon Tsarapkin, the chief of the 
Soviet delegation at Geneva, said this year, 
"Agreement could speedily be reached on all out- 
standing questions on the basis of the proposals 
submitted by the Soviet Union." What sort of a 
system of control would result if agreement were 
to be reached on this basis? Under the Anglo- 
American treaty, an earthshock, if unidentified, 
could set in motion an immediate process of 
inspection and verification. What would happen 
under the Soviet system if an unidentified earth- 
shock took place within the borders of the Soviet 
Union? 
Under the Soviet system, such an unidentified 
event would not even be inspected in the first 4 
years after the treaty came into force. 
If the event occurred after the inspection sys- 
tem was operating, there is no assurance that it 
would be reported properly to the control head- 
quarters. The chief of the control post would be 
a Soviet citizen, and it cannot be assumed that 
any man would inspect his own country with ruth- 
less impartiality. Soviet proposals require, more- 
over, that one third of the technical staff of control 
posts be persons recommended by the Soviet Gov- 
ernment and that no member of the staff can be 
appointed without Soviet consent. A staff com- 
posed of persons acceptable to the host country 
would obviously have ample chance for malprac- 
tice in reading, analyzing, or reporting the results 
of instrumentation. 
If an event in the Soviet Union were reported 
to the control headquarters, a decision on its eligi- 
bility for inspection would have to be made. 
Unless it were possible to locate the event with 
complete certainty within an area of 75 square 
miles, it would not be eligible for inspection under 
the quota according to the Soviet proposal. 
Since the Soviet view is that to be thus eligible an 
event must be, in addition, in Chairman Khru- 
shchev's words, "suspected of being an atomic ex- 
plosion," the Soviet representative, through an 
individual interpretation of the seismic data, might 
even reject an inspection of an event by asserting 
that it was not suspicious. 
If the event were actually certified for in- 
spection, the United States and the United King- 
dom would have to decide whether to use one of 
the three annual inspections permitted by the 
Soviet Union. All three inspections could not be 
used in the early months of a year, because the 
rest of the year would then be a complete holiday 
from inspection. This would mean that up to the 
last weeks only two inspections a year would be 
effectively available to check on the 100 or more 
unidentified seismic events above 4.75 seismic mag- 
nitude each year in the whole of the Soviet Union. 
If an inspection team set out to look at the site, 
the control organization would have to work out 
inspection procedures. Up to this point, the So- 
viet Union has resisted efforts to set forth such 
procedures. It now advocates the replacement 
of the single impartial administrator envisaged in 
the treaty by a tripartite administrative board- 
the so-called "troika." While the "troika" could 
not veto a formal decision to inspect-a decision 
made by either the United States, the United 
Kingdom, or the Soviet Union-it could effectively 
veto the practical arrangements for inspection. 
Therefore if an unidentified event in the Soviet 
Union did pass the Soviet obstacle course and was 
actually recorded; was read, analyzed, and re- 
ported to the control organization; met the arbi- 
trary criteria imposed by the Soviet Union; and 
was within the quota of three insisted on by the 
Soviet Union-if all this were done, the Soviet 
representative could still obstruct the control proc- 
ess by refusing to agree to adequate or efficient 
procedures for on-site inspection. Moreover, with 
Soviet insistence that inspection on its territory be 
carried out under the leadership of a Soviet citizen 
whose technical staff must be 50 percent Soviet, 
the reliability of the inspection operation would 
always be doubtful. 
Under the Soviet proposal, in short, no staff 
would be hired, no control posts established, no 
instruments set up, no interpretation of seismic data 
made, and thus in effect no on-site inspections 
undertaken without the consent of the Soviet r e p  
resentative on the "troika" At almost every stage 
in the process, there would be abundant opportu- 
nity to thwart and block the mechanism of control. 
The whole purpose of the test-ban treaty is to 
deter clandestine tests. What deterrence would 
this Soviet system offer? If the Soviet Union is 
planning no violations, why does it insist on sham 
control? .I 
Background for Geneva 
The problem of fallout came sharply to the 
world's attention in 1954, when both the United 
States and the Soviet Union tested large-yield nu- 
clear weapons in the atmosphere with marked 
radioactive aftereffects. In the next years, as scien- 
tists analyzed the long-term effects of radioactive 
contamination on the bones, the blood, and the 
germ plasm of man, concern over the continuation 
of nuclear testing grew everywhere in the world. 
In 1954 Prime Minister Nehru called for a "stand- 
still agreement" on nuclear testing. In 1955 the 
Soviet Union proposed "an agreement on the cessa- 
tion of experiments with all types of nuclear weap- 
ons." In the next years, Soviet officials assailed 
those who wish to associate test suspension with 
broader disarmament measures for "artificially 
linking" unrelated issues. As concern spread on 
every side, Prime Minister Nehru in November 
1957 appealed to "the great leaders, more especially 
of America and Russia, . . . to stop all nuclear 
test explosions and thus to show to the world that 
they are determined to end this menace, and to 
proceed also to bring about effective disarmament." 
Early in 1958 President Eisenhower suggested to 
Marshal Bulganin, then the Soviet Prime Minister, 
that technical groups take up various aspects of 
disarmament, including the control of a test ban. A 
series of exchanges between the two Governments 
led to a Conference of Experts from eight countries 
at Geneva in July and August 1958. After delib- 
eration, they concluded that a control system to 
detect violation of a test ban was technically feasi- 
ble. In late August the United States Government, 
welcoming the experts' report, proposed negotia- 
tion among the nuclear powers looking toward the 
suspension of tests and the establishment of the 
control system. At the same time the United States 
Government said that, unless the Soviet Union re- 
sumed testing, it would stop further testing for 1 
year from the beginning of the negotiations. 
In October 1958 the United States completed 
its last series of nuclear tests. The Conference on 
the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests 
opened in Geneva on October 3 1. On November 1 
and 3 the Soviet Union exploded nuclear devices. 
The United States nevertheless declared that it 
would continue its test suspension unless the Soviet 
Union conducted further tests. 
Purposes of the Conference 
The essential problem at the Geneva conference 
was the establishment of a system of control reliable 
enough to span the abyss of suspicions between the 
Western democracies and the Soviet Union. The 
need for building trust through verifiable safe- 
guards is, of course, basic to the survival of nations. 
Wherever a nation gives up any part of its military 
strength, it must act with utmost care, for the lives 
of its people are at stake. With regard to nuclear 
testing, the specific danger is that of clandestine 
testing-testing which evades the instruments of 
detection. Obviously, if two nations promise to 
stop testing and one tests secretly while the other 
remains faithful to the covenant, the cheating 
nation reaps military advantages which, in time, 
may become decisive. 
The United States delegation laid down three 
requirements for effective control : 
1. The system of control must be capable of 
detecting nuclear explosions prohibited by 
the treaty. 
2. All events which cannot be identified as nat- 
ural by the system must be eligible for in- 
spection even though all unidentified events 
will not in fact be inspected. 
3. The number of inspections must be related 
to the number of unidentified events. The 
inspection bridge, in other words, must vary 
in length between events detected and events 
identified. 
For its part, the Soviet Union lost few opportuni- 
ties to profess its desire for a test ban. Thus in 
January 1959 the Soviet Government declared that 
it had "been persistently pressing for a cessation of 
atomic and hydrogen weapon tests as a first and 
highly important step towards a radical solution of 
the disarmament problem." 
Two and a half years of patient negotiation 
produced progress. In 1961, when President 
Kennedy ordered the review of the U.S. position, 
prospects for agreement on the first arms control 
measure of the nuclear age seemed favorable. 
The world watched the reunion of the delegates at 
Geneva in March 1961 with high expectation. 
Then at the first session of the resumed conference 
the Soviet representative suddenly repudiated an 
already agreed portion of the treaty and reversed a 
good deal of the progress of 2% years. 
In order to understand what happened at Ge- 
neva, it is necessary to take a hard look at the 
points of disagreement. Even before the 1961 
meetings, these fell in two groups: the technical 
issues involved in detecting tests underground, and 
the political issues involved in inspection and 
control. 
Underground Testing 
The detectability of nuclear explosions depends 
essentially on how large they are and where they 
are held. Nuclear tests in the earth's atmos- 
phere-and it is these tests which produce nearly 
all the radioactive fallout-are relatively easy to 
identify. Even without a complete treaty control 
system, it is possible to identify atmospheric fall- 
out tests in the 5-kiloton range with high relia- 
bility. Tests in the ocean present harder but by 
no means insoluble problems. Tests in outer space 
are more tricky, but within limits the signals they 
generate can be recorded by a variety of instru- 
ments located on the earth or in satellites. 
For all these tests, various detection methods are 
available, including sound, light, radiowaves, radi- 
ation, and radioactive debris. Tests underground 
provide a far more difficult challenge. Here the 
earth swallows up signals which might otherwise 
be detectable. Only one method is now known: 
the measurement of the seismic waves transmitted 
through the earth as a result of the earthshock. 
And seismic measurement is complicated by the 
fact that the thousands of earthquakes occurring 
naturally every year often give off signals very simi- 
lar to those of manrnade underground explosions. 
In the summer of 1958, the Conference of Ex- 
perts evaluated the art of underground detection 
on the evidence from the single underground test 
that had then been conducted. But more detailed 
evidence, emerging from the series of underground 
American nuclear tests in the fall of 1958, showed 
that the Geneva group had underestimated the dif- 
ficulties of detecting underground events. In 
March 1959 a panel of American scientists, headed 
by Dr. Lloyd V. Berkner, recommended research 
programs to improve seismic detection and thus 
restore the capability originally claimed for the 
detection system. The Berkner report also warned 
that new methods could reduce the detectability of 
underground explosions, especially "decoupling"- 
that is, conducting explosions in large underground 
cavities where the seismic signals would be muf- 
fled. A nuclear detonation of about 20 kilotons 
in Nevada tuff would give off seismic signals in 
the 4.75 range; if the same detonation took place 
in a vast cavity in hard rock, seismic signals might 
be reduced by as much as a factor of 300. 
The new evidence confronted the conference 
with the fact that, given the state of the art, an 
agreement banning all nuclear tests under reliable 
safeguards was simply not feasible. For months, 
however, the Soviet delegation ignored the evi- 
dence and declined to admit the existence of a 
detection problem. When it finally agreed to a 
1 
technical conference, it refused to discuss the mat- 
ter in scientific terms, resorting instead to political 
exhortation and diatribe. Given the situation, 
President Eisenhower on December 29, 1959, said 
that the United States was no longer bound by its 
1 
self-imposed moratorium and considered itself free 
to resume testing, but would not do so "without 
announcing our intention in advance of any 
resumption." ' 
However, even if all nuclear explosions could 
not be detected, there was nonetheless no reason 
I 
why an agreement should not be reached banning 
such tests as could be adequately monitored. In 
March 1960, the Soviet Union agreed in principle 
to the idea of a first-step treaty containing a 
'1 
1 
"threshold"-that is, a treaty which would ban all 
I 
aboveground tests and all underground tests above 
the threshold of 4.75 magnitude. At the same 
time, the United States and the United Kingdom 
accepted the Soviet request for a moratorium on 
underground tests below the threshold, and the 
Soviet Union accepted the Anglo-American request 
for a research program to work out effective in- 
' The United States has not resumed testing. 
spection techniques for such tests. In May 1960, 
Ambassador Tsarapkin declared, "The Soviet 
Union has no objection if the U.S.S.R., the United 
States and the United Kingdom carry out, during 
the implementation of that programme, a strictly 
limited number of joint underground nuclear ex- 
plosions in order to verify the methods and instru- 
mentation for controlling the cessation of 
underground nuclear weapons tests below the 
stated limit.'' Scientists from the three nations 
met in Geneva and exchanged ideas on the design 
of the research program. 
But Soviet interest in improving seismic detec- 
tion capabilities soon flagged. At the end of May 
1960, Mr. Tsarapkin repudiated the view of his 
own scientists that a research program was neces- 
sary. In the months since, the Soviet Union has 
steadfastly declined to support seismic research. 
In particular, the Soviet Union has done its best to 
prevent research into the prevention of cheating, 
especially through decoupling-though it seems 
difficult to know how the Control Commission 
could be expected to catch cheaters unless more is 
learned about the whole cheating process. As 
David Ormsby-Gore, the head of the British dele- 
gation, put it, "The Soviet representative is 
now . . . saying that, in certain cases, which are 1 
scientifically proved and which have not been de- 
nied by the Soviet Union, there would be no con- 
trol, and [yet] that no attempt would be made in 
a research programme to achieve control." 
Inspection and Control 
The absence of effective seismic identification 
makes inspection at the site of suspected nuclear 
explosions all the more critical. Instruments in 
the control posts can record and, within limits, 
locate an earthshock, but they frequently cannot 
identify it-that is, tell whether it was caused by 
an earthquake or an explosion. In some cases, the 
only way to find out may be by sending an inspec- 
tion team to the site of the phenomenon. 
The Geneva negotiators reached fairly quick 
agreement on the necessity for a veto-free quota of 
on-site inspections-that is, for a minimum yearly 
number of inspection trips which a nation would 
have to accept and could not veto. The British and 
American representatives, arguing that the number 
of inspections should be in reasonable proportion 
to the number of suspicious phenomena, proposed 
the "one out of five" principle-that only one out of 
five earthshocks be inspected. This meant that if, 
as the United States experts believe, over 100 large 
unidentified earthshocks above 4.75 magnitude 
occur every year in the Soviet Union, only 20 would 
be inspected at the site. (The United States and 
the United Kingdom offered the Soviet Union in 
return 40 inspections in their own territories.) 
The Soviet delegation, however, opposed the 
notion that there should be any relationship be- 
tween the number of inspections and the number 
of suspicious phenomena. It insisted, moreover, 
that the maximum number of on-site inspections 
to be carried out each year in the nuclear nations 
should be 3. "We simply propose this figure as a 
political compromise," Mr. Tsarapkin frankly' said, 
"without any relationship to the number of earth- 
quakes occurring annually-whether it be a hun- 
dred thousand or a thousand, a hundred or ten- 
without any relationship at all." The figure "3" is 
thus admittedly meaningless; and the reduction of 
on-site inspections to so small a number emascu- 
lates the whole enterprise of inspection. In prac- 
tice, governments would tend to "store" their quota 
until toward the end of the year lest a violator take 
adGantage of the exhaustion of the quota in order 
to conduct tests. 
The Soviet Union has sought in other ways to 
hedge round the inspection process. Thus, though 
the Soviet propaganda position is nominally all in 
favor of automatic and veto-free inspection within 
the quota-inspection in response to signals on the 
seismograph-its precise statements in this connec- 
tion are most carefully restricted and restrictive. 
The Soviet Union thus insists that a seismic event, 
to be eligible for inspection, must be pinpointed 
within an area of 200 square kilometers (about 75 
square miles). Because underground events fre- 
quently cannot be located with such precision and 
can practically never be so located with absolute 
certainty, this stipulation would have the effect of 
excluding a large proportion of (or possibly all) 
unidentified phenomena from inspection. On top 
of this, a seismic event, to be eligible for inspection, 
must, in the words of Chairman Khrushchev, 
repeated in the aide memoire of June 4, be 
"suspected of being an atomic explosion." Mr. 
Tsarapkin has similarly said, "The inspecting side 
would have the right to carry out, within the limits 
I 
of an established quota, the inspection of any event I 
that was not an earthquake." The italicized 
phrases suggest a possible joker : These phrases may 
be used to prejudge the very issue which the inspec- 
tion team is supposed to resolve. Even though 
there are criteria for inspection on which objective 
observers might agree, there is nothing to prevent 
the Soviet member of the "troika" from refusing to 
admit that the suspected event satisfies these cri- 
teria. In short, only events "suspected of being an 
atomic explosion" and located within an impossibly 
small area qualify, by the Soviet system, for veto- 
free inspection within the annual quota. If this is 
not the case, the Soviet delegation has steadfastly 
withstood all attempts at clarification. 
The Soviet Union has resisted the installation 
of an effective system of international control in 
other ways. There has been argument about the 
time when control should begin; the Soviet posi- 
tion is that there should be no on-site inspection 
for 4 years after the treaty enters into force; Mr. 
Tsarapkin has even spoken sarcastically about the 
United States and the United Kingdom as being 
"in a hurry to initiate inspection." There has 
been argument about the number of control posts 
to be established; the Soviet Union has consistently 
favored fewer posts than necessary for effective 
control. There has been argument about the staff- 
ing of control posts; the Soviet Union has insisted 
that the chief of any control post in its own terri- 
tory must be a Soviet citizen, that the chief of 
any on-site inspection team operating within the 
Soviet Union be a Soviet citizen, and that the team 
itself consist 50 percent of Soviet citizens. The 
effect of these Soviet proposals is to whittle inter- 
national inspection down to self -inspection-w hich 
means no effective inspection at all. 
The professed Soviet reason for resistance to an 
effective international inspection system is fear of 
espionage. But the American and British repre- 
sentatives at Geneva repeatedly assured the Soviet 
delegation that the government of an inspected 
country could assign an army of secret police to 
accompany the inspection team and watch its 
every move so long as the observers did not inter- 
fere with the technical inspection process. More- 
over, the inspection would take place within an 
area predetermined by seismograph and limited 
to 200 or 500 square kilometers. (The area of 
the Soviet Union is 2 1,000,000 square kilometers; 
if 20 inspections were made each year in different 
parts of the Soviet Union, not more than one two- 
thousandths of Soviet territory would be inspected. 
In addition, most seismic events in the U.S.S.R. 
are concentrated in remote and sparsely populated 
spots making up a small percentage of the total 
area of the Soviet Union. ) 
Any reasonable nation should be satisfied by 
these treaty safeguards limiting the scope of inspec- 
tion to its essential need. One is forced to con- 
clude that the alleged Soviet fear of espionage is 
no more than the conditioned reflex of a totalitar- 
ian state. The Soviet Government must recog- 
nize the test-ban treaty for what it is: a rational 
means-from which it has nothing to fear-of 
reducing the likelihood of nuclear war. I t  must 
realize that the inherent dynamism of modern 
weapons technology, if uncontrolled, could eventu- 
ally lead to the destruction of Soviet society as well 
as that of the rest of the world. 
Anticlimax in 1961 
In spite of these persisting disagreements on 
questions of underground testing and of inspection, 
so much progress had been made in narrowing dif- 
ferences that the people of the world looked ahead 
with eager confidence to the resumption of negotia- 
tions in Geneva in 196 1. President Kennedy had 
declared during his Presidential campaign his 
determination to secure an "effective international 
agreement banning all tests"; and the result of his 
review of the American policy position was the 
development of the series of new proposals, de- 
signed to break the negotiating deadlock. 
These proposals, submitted by Ambassador 
Arthur H. Dean on March 2 1, were as follows : 
1. To reduce the number of on-site inspections 
in each of the nuclear countries to a possible 
12, depending on the number of suspicious 
seismic events ; 
2. To reduce the number of control posts on 
Soviet territory from 2 1 to 19 ; 
3. To extend from 27 months to 3 years the 
proposed moratorium on smaller under- 
ground tests and the associated research 
program ; 
4. To institute means for a ban on all nuclear 
weapon tests at high altitudes and in outer 
space ; 
5. To ask Congress for legislative authority to 
permit Soviet inspection of the internal 
mechanism of the nuclear devices used in the 
seismic research and peaceful uses programs; 
6. To accept the Soviet request for a veto over 
the annual budget of the control organiza- 
tion ; 
7. To accept the Soviet demand for a parity of 
seats between Western and Soviet bloc states 
on the top Control Commission-an arrange- 
ment which would give the Soviet Union a 
voice in guiding the control system equal to 
that of the United States and the United 
Kingdom combined, and which would be un- 
precedented in an international organization. 
Instead of welcoming this attempt to resolve 
outstanding differences, the Soviet Union re- 
sponded with retraction of earlier agreements and 
a root-and-branch assault on long-accepted prin- 
ciples of international organization. In particu- 
lar, it advanced the doctrine of the "troika9'-the 
proposal that the single administrator of the con- 
trol organization be replaced by a tripartite board, 
representing the Soviet Union, the allied democ- 
racies, and the neutrals, and required to act in 
unanimity. 
The "troika" proposal meant, of course, that 
each nuclear power would have a veto over every 
administrative act of the control organization ex- 
cept for the somewhat illusory rights of inspection 
within the annual quota. In advancing this pro- 
posal against the idea of an impartial administra- 
tor, Soviet policy underwent a startling reversal. 
On January 14, 1960, Mr. Tsarapkin had assured 
the other delegates, "Out of the three thousand 
million human beings on earth we shall always be 
able to find someone on whom you and we can 
agree." Again, in February, Mr. Tsarapkin said, 
"In neutral countries it will always be possible to 
find a person, a really neutral person, who can be 
used for the job of carrying out the duties of admin- 
istrator." In June he said, "It will always be pos- 
sible to discover in the world a person acceptable 
to both sides for nomination for the post as admin- 
istrator." Now Mr. Tsarapkin says, "It is impos- 
sible to find a completely impartial neutral person." 
In the words of the Soviet aide memoire, ". . . 
while there are neutral states there are no--nor 
can there be-neutral men." 
While no man perhaps can be completely neu- 
tral in his innermost thoughts, many men have dis- 
ciplined their innermost thoughts to make possible 
the equitable adjudication of particular cases; it is 
this neutrality in deed which underlies systems of 
justice everywhere in the world, including the So- 
viet Union, which underlies the whole philosophy 
and practice of science, and which equally under- 
lies the effectiveness of international organization. 
Dedicated men in the United Nations and other 
international bodies are demonstrating every day 
that loyalty to their own states does not interfere 
with loyalty to a community of nations. 
Nor can it be asserted that the "troika" is neces- 
sary to protect the Soviet Union against the way- 
ward independence of the single administrator. 
Under provisions of the treaty already accepted by 
all sides, the administrator is made accountable to 
the policymaking Control Commission and can 
work only under its continuous supervision. His 
appointment and the appointment of his first dep- 
uty are subject to Soviet veto. The Soviet Union 
has the right to nominate two additional deputy 
administrators. The staff of the control organiza- 
tion is to include equal representation from the two 
nuclear sides. Decisions as to the total amount of 
the annual budget, and as to amendment of the 
treaty, are subject to Soviet veto. 
Is the Soviet Union disturbed by fears that a 
single administrator might corrupt the control sys- 
tem? Or does its attitude really spring from a 
profound distaste for effective control at all? 
Chairman Khrushchev said with brutal frankness 
on July 10, 1961, "Even if all the countries of the 
world adopted a decision that did not accord with 
the interests of the Soviet Union and threatened its 
security, the Soviet Union would not recognize such 
a decision but would uphold its rights, relying on 
force." 
Can the World Ever Stop Nuclear Tests? 
Denis Healey of the British Labour Party recently 
said of the test-ban negotiations, "If Nikita Khru- 
shchev had deliberately aimed to undermine the 
position of those who believe that Russia recognizes 
a common interest with America in ending the arms 
race and stopping the spread of atomic weapons, he 
could scarcely have succeeded more completely." 
In an effort to disguise its opposition to a test-ban 
treaty, the Soviet Union, repudiating its own long- 
held position that the test ban is a separate issue, 
now proposes that test-ban negotiations be merged 
with general disarmament talks. In 1959, the 
Soviet Government said that it "has proceeded and 
still proceeds from the premise that the question of 
ending tests can be solved straightaway independ- 
ently of the solution of the other problems of dis- 
armament, given the desire of all the nuclear 
powers." Its present shift of position is transpar- 
ently a cynical effort to wave away the test-ban 
problem. For, if the nuclear powers cannot agree 
on the relatively manageable problem of the test 
ban, they can hardly hope for agreement on the 
far more intricate problems of general disarma- 
ment. 
Merging the test-ban negotiations with the com- 
prehensive disarmament negotiations is essentially 
a Soviet effort to perpetuate a situation in which 
the United States and the United Kingdom accept 
an uninspected moratorium on testing. For the 
United States, such a moratorium would be, in fact, 
inspected, not only by the will of the Government 
but by the relentlessly vigilant public opinion of an 
open society. If ever the United States were dis- 
posed to test clandestinely, it could neither conceal 
this course from the American people or the world 
nor justify it to them. But the Soviet Union, with 
its closed society, its Government unaccountable to 
parliament or press or public opinion, its actions 
shrouded in a veil of secrecy, can, if it wishes, con- 
duct nuclear tests without serious fear of exposure. 
Without a treaty-backed inspection system, it is 
simply impossible to tell whether secret nuclear 
testing is going on in closed societies. 
The danger is that secret testing may produce 
a technological breakthrough in nuclear weapons 
development, giving the testing nations a decisive 
advantage. For almost 3 years, the United States 
has been willing to assume the risk of not testing 
nuclear weapons without the certainty that the 
Soviet Union has likewise stopped its testing. No 
nation determined to protect the freedom of its 
people can accept this risk indefinitely. 
The Soviet attitude would seem to raise a funda- 
mental qu~stion : For the U.S.S.R., is the nuclear 
test ban only a pretext for propaganda and not a 
road to peace? 
But the people of the world have not given up 
their hope for universal disarmament. They have 
not given up their hope for the control of nuclear 
weapons or for the elimination of nuclear testing. 
They insist on a continuing struggle to abolish war. 
The outcome of great issues depends on the 
cumulative effects of individual actions. Every 
person has a duty to inform himself of the deep 
significance of the test-ban treaty for disarmament 
and peace. And every person can help others to 
learn, which will often mean action through larger 
organizations-schools, newspapers, political par- 
ties, voluntary associations of many kinds. Then 
both persons and organizations should do all within 
their power to make their governments hear and 
feel and understand the issues. Action by govern- 
ments is especially important in the United Na- 
tions, the forum of aspirations for all the world's 
peoples. 
The test-ban treaty is a first essential step toward 
disarmament and the abolition of war. To reject 
the Geneva treaty would accelerate the arms race. 
It would invite the resumption of nuclear tests. 
Chairman Khrushchev said on June 21 of this year, 
"Quite a few devices requiring practical testing 
have been developed in the Soviet Unionyy-a 
yearning which he alone, among the leaders of the 
great powers has expressed. Rejection of the 
treaty would require the other nuclear powers to 
consider whatever steps may be necessary in their 
own self-defense. It would encourage the devel- 
opment of new weapons and the spread of nuclear 
weapons to additional nations. If any nation re- 
sumed fallout tests-tests in the earth's atmos- 
phere-it would increase the genetic and biologi- 
cal hazards of radioactive contamination. I t  
would defer mankind's great hope that interna- 
tional institutions might in time banish the curse 
of war. 
The test-ban treaty has become the symbol of 
man's hope for a peaceful world. The United 
States and the United Kingdom are fully prepared 
to welcome within their borders all the interna- 
tional control operations necessary to insure an 
effective ban on nuclear testing. They ask the 
Soviet Union to accept no more in the way of con- 
trol than they accept for themselves. If it rejects 
the test-ban treaty, the Soviet Union will take on 
itself an awful burden of responsibility for the 
future of mankind. 
The people of the world must pray that the final 
effort on the part of the United States and the 
United Kingdom to conclude a test-ban treaty will 
be rewarded with success. For the sake of human- 
ity, the Soviet Union must reconsider its stand. 

